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Religion always has held a special place in the Constitution;1 yet
most federal courts, including the Supreme Court, consistently fail to
protect the religious freedoms of Native Americans. Religious freedom
is guaranteed by the first amendment, which provides that "Congress
shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."' 2 Tradi-
tionally, courts have broadly interpreted the free exercise clause to pro-
vide a constitutional guarantee against governmental interference with
religious exercise. 3 However, in cases involving the public use of Native
American sacred sites, courts have narrowly interpreted this first amend-
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Sheldon H. Nahmod and Professor
Judith Royster of IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law for their thoughtful guidance and
encouragement.
1. See McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 14-34. In a discussion
of religious pluralism as a major element of the liberal political theory underlying the Constitution,
McConnel asserted that the founders recognized the special character and needs of religion and that
this same recognition exists in modem theory. McConnel also addressed the influence of natural law
theory on the development of the free exercise clause, and asserted that, under natural law theory,
which recognized in principle the possibility of higher claims than those of the government, true
religious claims were granted higher dignity than those of the state. Id. at 15-16.
For further discussion of the special place religion holds under the Constitution, see generally,
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Ely's thesis is that the Constitution primarily reflects
governmental processes rather than values, yet he singles out religion as "an important substantive
value" reflected in the Constitution. Id. at 94.
2. The first amendment contains two clauses relating to religion. These clauses provide:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...," U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first clause, known as the establishment clause, was in-
tended to prevent coercion (and lesser forms of governmental pressure) of religious belief and con-
duct; the second, known as the free exercise clause, was intended to encourage a multiplicity of sects.
McConnel, supra note 1, at 20-22.
Although the clause "Congress shall make no law" might be read as permitting establishment of
religion by the other branches of government, it was probably worded that way because the drafters
thought any restrictions of freedoms would most likely come in the form of laws, whicl9 only Con-
gress could make. L. PFEFFER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 23 (1979).
In 1868, the fourteenth amendment, forbidding the states from depriving any person of life,
liberty or property without due process, extended the first amendment religion clauses to state
actions.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 21-61. Except for Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 145 (1878) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), all the'Supreme Court free
exercise cases have involved questions of governmental interference with, rather than outright
prohibitions of, the free exercise of religion.
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ment protection.4 A promising exception was the Ninth Circuit decision
in Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson,5 which
upheld a free exercise claim contesting the government's plans to permit
timber harvesting and road construction through lands which Native
Americans considered sacred and essential to the survival of their reli-
gion.6 That exception was short lived. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association,7 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit decision relative to the free exercise claim8 and thus continued
the narrow interpretation of the free exercise clause in Native American
sacred site cases.
In Lyng, the Supreme Court held that, even if the governmental in-
terference were virtually to destroy the Native Americans' religion, "the
Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify up-
holding [the Native Americans'] legal claims."9 The Lyng Court con-
fronted and rejected traditional methods of free exercise analysis and
distorted principles advanced in prior religious freedom decisions involv-
ing more conventional religious interests. To reach its conclusion that
the Native Americans' religion was not unconstitutionally burdened, the
Court essentially ignored the cautious construction and careful develop-
ment of free exercise jurisprudence which had evolved since the drafting
of the Constitution.
The Lyng decision was consistent, however, with the narrow and
regressive interpretation of free exercise protection singularly applied in
Native American religious cases by lower federal courts. This dichotomy
of free exercise protection, liberally construed and applied in the context
of conventional religions, yet denied when the religious freedom of Na-
tive Americans is at issue, cannot be justified.
Part I of this Note will discuss the historical setting in which Lyng
4. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.) (Hopi and Navajo Indians denied in-
junction prohibiting development of ski resort on sacred sites), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983);
Fools Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.) (Lakota and Tsistsistas Indians denied injunction
preventing recreational projects and construction on religious sites), cert. denied. 464 U.S. 977, 464
U.S. 1056 (1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.) (Navajo Indians denied petition for
injunction prohibiting operation of water project that flooded sacred sites), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954
(1980); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.) (Cherokee Indians denied
petition for injunction prohibiting completion of Tellico Dam project that prevented access to sacred
sites), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 66-81.
5. 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). In Peterson two consolidated actions were brought by an
association of Northwest Indians, the state of California and others against the Chief of the U.S.
Forest Service and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 795 F.2d at 689-90.
6. 795 F.2d at 692-93.
7. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
8. Id. at 458.
9. Id. at 452.
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was decided. Part II will present the facts underlying Lyng and will pro-
vide an overview of the courts' reasoning at the trial, appellate and
Supreme Court levels. The conclusion reached in Part III is that the
Lyng Court's drastic departure from established free exercise doctrine
continued the misapplication of first amendment doctrine in Native
American free exercise cases. In addition, the analysis will reveal that in
Lyng, the Supreme Court resurrected an outmoded and embarrassing ju-
dicial attitude toward the constitutional status of Native Americans. Fi-
nally, this Note will reject the frequently asserted argument that, because
courts do not understand Native American religious beliefs and prac-
tices, traditional free exercise analysis is inadequate in Native American
religion cases. This Note will suggest instead that the religious practices
of Native Americans, though fundamentally different from Judeo-Chris-
tian notions of religion, clearly are not judicially incomprehensible and
should be considered within the framework of established free exercise
doctrine. Traditional free exercise tests are appropriate in these cases
and, if properly applied, would afford Native Americans the religious
freedom guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The historical backdrop for the Lyng decision is best viewed from
four perspectives. First, an overview of the Supreme Court's century-
long development of free exercise interpretation illustrates how the Court
carefully and steadily expanded free exercise rights, establishing worka-
ble and accepted standards in free exercise cases in general. Second,
early cases in which the Supreme Court articulated and contoured its
interpretation of the "dependent" status of Native Americans, reveal the
ongoing political, cultural and legal struggle between the United States
government and Native Americans. These cases also introduce the judi-
cial attitude toward Native Americans that seemed to underlie the
Court's reasoning in Lyng. Third, the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act reflects what purports to be the current national policy of ac-
commodating Native American religious practices. And finally, recent
sacred site cases illustrate the courts' uneasy application of first amend-
ment principles to Native American free exercise claims, culminating
with the Supreme Court's denial of the claims in Lyng.
A. The Supreme Court and the Free Exercise Clause
James Madison, generally recognized as a leader in framing the first
19891
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amendment,' 0 believed that both religion and government were best
served if government did not interfere with religion, except to preserve
public order and protect the legal rights of all sects." Madison wrote
that "[t]here is not a shadow of right in the general government to inter-
meddle with religion. Its least interference with it would be a most fla-
grant usurpation."' 2
Nevertheless, in Reynolds v. United States, 3 the Supreme Court's
first case to deal with the free exercise clause, ' 4 the Court chose to follow
Thomas Jefferson's view of free exercise' 5 - that society should be pro-
tected from undue religious influence' 6 - and unanimously held that a
federal statute directly prohibiting religious conduct was constitutional. 17
The Court held in Reynolds that a law prohibiting polygamy could be
applied to a Mormon even though polygamy was an important element
of the Mormon religion.' 8 Although the Reynolds decision established
that the Constitution mandated a "wall of separation between church
and state,"' 9 the Court reasoned that this separation applied only to reli-
gious opinion or belief, not to actions.20
10. See McConnel, supra note 1, at 20 ("James Madison, foremost expositor of the pluralist
theory of the Constitution itself, appeared in Congress as the foremost expositor of the proposed
Religion Clauses as well."). See also 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 88 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner
eds. 1987) [hereinafter FOUNDERS].
11. IX THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 487 (G. Hunt ed. 1910), construed in L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816-17 (1978). There are two other distinct schools of thought
which influenced the drafters: the evangelical view that "worldly corruptions... might consume the
churches" if separation were not maintained; and the Jeffersonian view that church should be sepa-
rated from state to safeguard secular interests (public and private) against religious takeover. L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816-17 (1978).
12. Virginia Ratifying Convention Papers 11:130-31 (J. Madison) (June 12, 1788), reprinted in
FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 88. Throughout his prominent involvement with the Virginia constitu-
tional debates over the disestablishment of Anglicanism in Virginia, Madison articulated many of his
views regarding the free exercise of religion. See generally FOUNDERS, supra note 10; Pepper, Reyn-
olds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 319,
n.41 [hereinafter Alternatives]. In turn, Madison's views played a leading role in the drafting of the
religion clauses of the first amendment. Alternatives, supra at 316, n.29.
13. 98 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 145 (1879).
14. P. KURLAND, OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (University of Chicago
private circulation pamphlet) (1961) 29, No. 1, 6 ("For practical purposes, the Supreme Court's
concern with the First Amendment religion clauses begins with Reynolds v. United States.").
15. 98 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 164. One commentator asserts that the Reynolds Court's preference
for Jefferson over Madison was not justifiable since Madison was the primary figure in the Virginia
Constitutional Convention and one of the leading figures in the drafting and adoption of the religion
clauses by Congress. Alternatives, supra note 12, at 320, n.45. Jefferson took no part in either of
these proceedings, as he was in Paris at the time. Id.
16. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 11.
17. 98 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 164.
18. Id. at 166-67. The Reynolds Court explained, "To permit [polygamy] would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself." Id. at 167.
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id.
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After Reynolds, however, the Court moved away from the Jefferso-
nian approach to free exercise interpretation and, initiating a steady but
cautious trend toward the Madisonian view, began to extend first amend-
ment protection against government interference with religious action as
well as belief. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,2' for example, the Court ac-
knowledged that the first amendment was intended to embrace both the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act.22 The Court noted, however,
that although the freedom to believe was absolute, the freedom to act
could be regulated for the protection of society.23 Nonetheless, the Court
cautioned against regulating religious action except to achieve permissi-
ble ends and in a way that would not unduly infringe protected religious
freedom. 24
Braunfeld v. Brown,25 decided twenty-one years after Cantwell,
marked the Supreme Court's first free exercise case in which the govern-
mental interference involved was indirect;26 that is, the religious exercise
at issue was not directly prohibited by law. In Braunfeld, the Court held
that a state Sunday closing law did not unconstitutionally abridge the
religious rights of a Jewish business owner whose religion forbade con-
ducting business on Saturday, in observance of the Sabbath.27 In a plu-
rality opinion, the Court recognized Cantwell's inclusion of religious
action under the free exercise clause, but nonetheless emphasized the
Reynolds distinction and again quoted Jefferson's interpretation of the
free exercise clause.28 Further, the Braunfeld Court suggested that when
the burden on religious action was indirect, the court should focus on
whether reasonable alternative means existed for the state to reach its
goal, but held that in Braunfeld, the burden on religion was so slight that
it was not necessary to determine such alternative means.29
In subsequent cases involving indirect burdens on the free exercise
of religion, the dissenting Justices in Braunfeld were particularly influen-
tial. For example, Justice Brennan's dissent in Braunfeld noted that the
plurality's lack of deference to questions of religious guarantees was in-
21. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Court in Cantwell overturned the convictions of three Jehovah's
Witnesses for soliciting religious contributions without a license.
22. Id. at 303. The Cantwell decision also made first amendment guarantees applicable to state
legislation through the fourteenth amendment. Note, Of Courts, Clauses and Native American Cul-
ture: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 9 N. Ill. L. Rev. 419, 422 (1989).
23. 310 U.S. at 303-04.
24. Id. at 304.
25. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
26. Cf Alternatives, supra note 12, at 330.
27. 366 U.S. at 605, 609.
28. Id. at 603-05.
29. Id. at 605-09.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
consistent with the standards applied to questions of other first amend-
ment freedoms, 30 an inconsistency the Court attempted to remedy in
later cases. Furthermore, the reasoning in later cases was consistent with
Justice Stewart's objection that, although the religious burden in Braun-
feld was indirect, it was not slight because it forced a choice between
"religious faith and economic survival... a cruel choice.., no state can
constitutionally command." '3'
Up to and through Braunfeld, the Court required the state to afford
little deference to religious liberty and provided free exercise protection
on a case-by-case basis. The Court focused primarily on whether the
state acted reasonably in light of the importance of its goal.32 To this
point in the history of free exercise jurisprudence, most courts, including
the Supreme Court, had not expressly resolved a major free exercise
claim in favor of the individual and against the state.33
Interpretation of the free exercise clause was abruptly transformed 34
with Sherbert v. Verner,35 in which the Court held that a state could not
statutorily deny unemployment benefits to a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church for refusing, on religious grounds, to accept employ-
ment that required her to work on Saturday. 36 Indeed, the holding in
Sherbert marked a clear pronouncement of the Court's elevation of reli-
gious freedom to a position of strict protection. The Court declared that
for a state merely to show that it had a reasonable interest at stake was
not enough, and that "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests" could permit governmental limitations on religious freedom.37
However, the Sherbert opinion betrayed a certain reluctance by the
Court to embrace fully its sudden elevation of religious freedom. Just as
it announced and applied the new "compelling interest" test, it reasoned
that the Braunfeld decision was consistent with the new criteria. The
Court stated that in Braunfeld, the state had "a strong state interest in
providing one uniform day of rest for all workers.1 38 This contradiction
30. Id. at 611-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
32. Alternatives, supra note 12, at 331.
33. Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause,
1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1220.
34. Alternatives, supra note 12, at 331.
35. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
36. Id. at 403-06. The state statute regulating the disbursement of unemployment funds cre-
ated only an indirect burden on religious exercise; however, in Sherbert, the Court did not emphasize
the indirect nature of the burden, as it had in Braunfeld.
37. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
38. Id. at 408-09. Three justices of the Sherbert majority were from the plurality in Braunfeld;
this may explain the reluctance to admit the obvious. Alternatives, supra note 12, at 332 n.104.
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led one commentator to observe that "[w]hat the Court gave with one
hand [in Sherbert] it may have taken away with the other."'3 9 In con-
trast, three of the Justices in Sherbert explicitly stated that Braunfeld was
inconsistent with and must be overruled by Sherbert.4° Further, "despite
much grappling and hair splitting," most commentators have agreed that
Sherbert effectively overruled Braunfeld.41
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,42 the Supreme Court reinforced the decisive
language in Sherbert. In Yoder, the Court held that the free exercise
clause required the state to exempt the Amish from full compliance with
compulsory education law because numerous aspects of public education
were inconsistent with Amish religious beliefs.43 The Yoder Court re-
quired the state to show not only that its interest was compelling (the
standard established in Sherbert) but also that it could not accomplish its
goals by less intrusive means. 44 Furthermore, the Court required that
the governmental interest be examined in light of the specific harm that
would occur if the government accommodated the religious interest or
employed alternatives.45
However, Yoder, like Sherbert, championed the special protection
afforded religion under the Constitution in its holding, but then signifi-
cantly narrowed that protection in dicta. One commentator noted that,
overall, the Yoder opinion was "articulated in such a hedged and
cramped fashion as to suggest that it applied only to the unusual facts
before the Court, and then just barely."' 46 The Yoder Court held that
"only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."'47
The dicta in Yoder attempted to limit free exercise protection in two
significant ways. First, Yoder marked the Court's first attempt to ex-
amine religious convictions to determine whether such beliefs were wor-
thy of first amendment protection. Traditionally, the test for what
constituted protected "religion" was limited to the Court's consideration
39. Alternatives, supra note 12, at 332.
40. 374 U.S. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Justice
Harlan was joined in his dissent by Justice White).
41. Alternatives, supra note 12, at 332 n.104.
42. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. Id. at 234. Specifically, the Amish sought exemption from the last two years of public
education only. The Amish accepted compulsory elementary education generally but believed that
conventional higher learning would develop values they reject as influences that alienate man from
God. Id. at 212, 222.
44. Id. at 221, 236.
45. Id. at 236. See also Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause - Some Reflec-
tions on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L. REv. 265, 271 (1982) [hereinafter Conundrum].
46. Alternatives, supra note 12, at 333.
47. 406 U.S. at 215.
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of any extrinsic evidence that religion was being used "as a completely
fraudulent cloak."' 48 Yet, in Yoder, the Court reasoned that the free exer-
cise clause protected the Amish because their religious claims were in
fact grounded in religious belief rather than personal philosophy. 49 Fur-
ther, the Court found that the Amish convictions were shared by an or-
ganized group with century-old religious traditions which had
contributed to Western civilization,50 and that their religious tenets were
derived from a Biblical foundation.5"
The second and perhaps most significant undercutting element in
Yoder was the Court's elaborate examination of the nature and extent of
48. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 861. See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45
(D.D.C. 1968) (denying a religious exemption from federal drug regulations where evidence showed
only a tactical pretense of religion: members of the Neo-American Church were known as Boo
Hoos, the seal of the church was a three-eyed toad, and the church motto was "Victory Over
Horseshit."). Id. at 443-45.
A similar standard is applied to determine the sincerity of religious beliefs. In United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), the Supreme Court held that, in a charge of mail fraud based on the
solicitation of funds for a religion which they allegedly knew to be false, the sincerity of religious
doctrines or beliefs could not be considered by a judge or jury without violating the free exercise
clause. 322 U.S. at 86. Less than a decade later, in Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953), the
Court held that it was generally "no business of courts" to say that what is religion for one group is
not sincere religion under the protection of the first amendment. 345 U.S. at 69-70. But see United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), in which the Court elaborately defined sincerity of religion as
those beliefs that are "based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate
or upon which all else is ultimately dependent" or a sincere and meaningful belief "which occupies in
the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by [the orthodox belief in God]." 380 U.S. at 176.
49. 406 U.S. at 216. The Court distinguished the Amish religious beliefs from personal philoso-
phy in this way:
[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejec-
tion of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau re-
jected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would
not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than
religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Id.
One commentator suggested that the Yoder Court's distinction between personal and religious
creed was "reminiscent of Mr. Justice Stewart's now famous remark that he could not define hard
core obscenity but he knows when he sees it." CHURCH AND STATE - THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT xii (P. Kurland ed. 1975). Kurland also asserted that the distinction re-
flects that the first amendment's religion clauses mean what the Court says they mean.
50. 406 U.S. at 216-17. The Court approvingly described the religious tradition of the Amish,
and regarding the social isolation and self sufficiency of the Amish, the Court admonished, "[w]e
must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the civilization of the Western World
were preserved by members of religious orders who isolated themselves from all worldly influences
against great obstacles." Id. at 223.
51. Id. at 216. "That the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from their
faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction
from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, '[B]e not conformed to this world ... ' Id.
Given the period of civil unrest in the early seventies when Yoder was decided, the guidelines
that the Court espoused perhaps reflected the Court's concern for preventing a proliferation of litiga-
tion by various counterculture groups under the guise of religious organizations. One commentator
suggested that the Court in Yoder seemed to want "to say 'yes' to the Amish while saying 'no' to the
hippies." Alternatives, supra note 12, at 335.
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the burden on the Amish religious practices.5 2 The Amish claimed that
their religious beliefs pervaded their entire way of life, and that to compel
their children to attend public schools during the formative adolescent
years threatened the very survival of the Old Order Amish religion.5 3
The Yoder Court made clear that the primary elements of its decision in
Yoder included the pervasiveness of the religious practices (describing
them as "fundamental," "important," and "essential" to the Amish
faith) 54 and the severity of the impact (potential destruction of the Amish
religion and way of life). 55
Despite conflicting signals from Sherbert and Yoder, the lower fed-
eral courts viewed the holdings in those two cases as finally establishing a
constitutionally principled free exercise test. 56 The Yoder/Sherbert test
could be stated as: under the free exercise clause, the government could
not restrict religious belief or action unless the government demonstrated
that it had a compelling interest at stake that could not be achieved in a
less intrusive manner.
In Thomas v. Review Board,5 7 the Supreme Court followed the
Yoder/Sherbert analysis5 8 and held that the state could not deny unem-
ployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job. The Jeho-
vah's Witness had been employed making turrets for military tanks, and
he believed that the production of weapons violated his religious beliefs. 59
The Thomas Court emphasized that the government need not compel a
violation of religious belief, but only create a coercive impact to effect an
impermissible interference with religion.6° The Thomas Court, however,
departed from the decision in Yoder by abandoning the attempt to define
a "religious" belief. Noting that such a determination was "difficult and
52. Conundrum, supra note 45, at 276.
53. 406 U.S. at 209-12, 218. In accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish communities
generally, the Amish in Yoder believed that their children's attendance at high school would not
only expose them to the danger of censure by the church but would also endanger their own salva-
tion and that of their children. Id. at 209.
54. Id. at 210-19. The Court stated, "[W]e see that the record in this case abundantly supports
the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference,
but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily
living. Id. at 216.
55. Id. at 234-36.
56. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 35. See also Marcus, supra note 33, at 1232.
57. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
58. Id. at 713-14, 717-18, 720.
59. Id. at 709, 720. The Indiana Revi w Board for the Indiana Employment Security Division
found that Thomas left his job due to religious convictions. Id. at 712 n.6. The Indiana Appellate
Court accepted the Board's finding, but the Indiana Supreme Court viewed the record differently.
The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that " 'although the claimant's reasons for quitting were
described as religious, it was unclear what his belief was, and what the religious basis of his belief
was.' Id. at 714 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (1979)).
60. Id. at 717-18.
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delicate," the Court simply stated that "religious beliefs need not be ac-
ceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit first amendment protection. '61
From Reynolds through Thomas, the Supreme Court carefully ex-
panded free exercise protection from an extremely narrow interpretation
to the broad application illustrated by the Sherbert and Yoder holdings
and reinforced by Thomas. Thus, by the time the Court heard its first
Native American free exercise case, it had developed a fairly clear free
exercise doctrine. The compelling interest/least restrictive means test of
Sherbert and Yoder had prevailed, and the Court had begun to recognize
that even nontraditional religious beliefs and practices merited first
amendment protection. 62
B. The Lone Wolf Principle and the Special Status
of Native Americans
The status of Native Americans in relation to the United States gov-
ernment was defined and contoured by early Supreme Court cases in-
volving Native American property issues and the concomitant
governmental effort to "civilize" Native Americans for eventual assimila-
tion into colonial culture. These cases evidence a jurisprudential evolu-
tion of the notion that Native Americans possess a special relationship
with the federal government, a status likened to that of a ward to a
guardian - at least until they could be assimilated into the "Christian
mainstream. ' ' 63 The cases also demonstrate the transformation of the
guardian-ward relationship from one based on the duty to protect to a
relationship which served in effect as a virtually unlimited source of
power over Native Americans. This "power" interpretation of the
guardian-ward relationship led to and is embodied in the Lone Wolf prin-
ciple, which granted the United States government plenary power over
Native Americans.
In Johnson v. McIntosh," the Supreme Court first considered the
status of Native Americans. The Court characterized the Native Ameri-
61. Id. at 714.
62. Cf Marcus, supra note 33, at 1250-51. But see Alternatives, supra note 12, at 345 (Although
Yoder and Sherbert suggest broad protection by the free exercise clause, their conflicting signals and
internal inconsistencies left no clear course for future interpretation.). See also Conundrum, supra
note 45 ("The clause presents a conundrum, on its face providing absolute protection, neither articu-
lating nor implying any clear limitations.").
63. For an in-depth discussion of the development of the guardian-ward relationship based on
efforts to convert the Native Americans to Christianity, see Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
64. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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cans as heathens from whom Christian people had a right to take posses-
sion of the land.65 The Court noted in McIntosh that the European
discoverers of North America believed they had "made ample compensa-
tion to [the Native Americans] by bestowing on them civilization and
Christianity. ' 66 The Court described the Native Americans as "perpet-
ual inhabitants with diminutive rights... without the privileges of citi-
zens and under the perpetual protection and pupilage of the
government. ' 67 The McIntosh Court concluded that the initial dominion
over Native Americans was justified by the rules of discovery among the
European nations, which accepted the prior title of any Christian people,
but automatically gave title to those who discovered lands occupied by
non-Christians. 68
This guardian-ward relationship became the cornerstone of Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.69 In Cherokee
Nation, the Court was concerned with the relationship between the
United States and the Native Americans for purposes of determining the
applicability of Georgia statutes to persons residing on Cherokee Indian
lands within that state. 70 Specifically, the Native Americans sought an
injunction to prevent Georgia from seizing, for the use of the state, land
which the federal government had assured the Native Americans in trea-
ties.71 The Georgia legislature passed a law authorizing the land within
the Cherokee territory to be surveyed and distributed by lottery among
the people of Georgia.72 At the same session, the legislature of Georgia
passed another act, entitled "An act to declare void all contracts hereaf-
ter made with the Cherokee Indians, so far as the Indians are
concerned."7 3
Chief Justice Marshall began the Cherokee Nation opinion by stat-
ing, "If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better
calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined."' 74 But the Court
denied the injunction on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the
65. Id. at 576-77. The McIntosh Court explained that the early discovery charters authorized
discovery and possession of "such remote, heathen, and barbarous lands, as were not actually pos-
sessed by any Christian prince or people." Id. at 577.
66. Id. at 573.
67. Id. at 569. The Court also stated, "It is unnecessary to show, that they are not citizens in
the ordinary sense of that term, since they are destitute of the most essential rights which belong to
that character." Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 576-77.
69. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 15.
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merits of the case because the Native Americans were "domestic depen-
dent nations . . . in a state of pupilage," whose relationship with the
federal government resembled that of a "ward to his guardian. ' 75 Fur-
thermore, the Court reasoned that to provide the Cherokee Nation a ju-
dicial remedy was too great an exercise of political power and stated:
If it be true that the Cherokee Nation have rights, this is not the
tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that
wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be appre-
hended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent
the future.76
More than fifty years passed before the Supreme Court again inter-
preted the guardian-ward relationship between the federal government
and Native Americans. By then, Native Americans occupied far less ex-
pansive areas of land, and the government's power over Native Ameri-
cans had increased so dramatically as to include a power to abrogate
treaty rights. 77 In addition, by this time, participation in traditional Na-
tive American religious practices was punishable by imprisonment on the
"public policy" grounds that the religions were heathenish, a hindrance
to civilization and inimical to the Native Americans' progress.78 The
courts in this period treated the guardian-ward relationship as a source of
federal power in addition to and apart from the express power in the
Constitution to regulate commerce with Native Americans. 79
The federal power interpretation of the guardian-ward relationship
was evidenced in United States v. Kagama,80 in which the Court held
that federal criminal law applied to Native Americans who committed
crimes against other Native Americans on their own land.8' The Court
in Kagama declared that "[t]hese Indian tribes are the wards of the na-
tion. They are communities dependent on the United States .... From
their very weakness and helplessness . . . there arises the duty of protec-
tion, and with it the power."'82
75. Id. at 17. The Court in Cherokee Nation described the relationship between Native Ameri-
cans and the government in this way: "Their relations to the U.S. resemble that of a ward to his
guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal
to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their great father." Id.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Chambers, supra note 63, at 1223.
78. Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedom for Indigenous Americans, 65 OR. L. REv. 363,
370 (1986).
79. Id.
80. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
81. Id. at 383-84.
82. Id. (emphasis in original). The Kagama Court further explained, "The power of the Gen-
eral Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in num-
bers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It
must exist in that government, because it has never existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its
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The shift in emphasis away from the government's duty to protect
and toward the government's power over Native Americans under the
guardian-ward theory was even more pronounced in Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock.83 The Court in Lone Wolf held that the guardian-ward relationship
provided Congress plenary power to manage Native American prop-
erty.84 The Lone Wolf decision thereby solidified the notion that Native
American issues were strictly political questions and not subject to judi-
cial scrutiny.
In Lone Wolf, Native Americans had appeared before congressional
committees to oppose Congress' plan to allot and sell tribally-owned land
pursuant to a treaty. The Native Americans claimed that the treaty vio-
lated an earlier treaty which expressly prohibited any sale or allotment of
reservation lands without their consent.85 The Native Americans sought
relief under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, claiming that the
required three-quarters of the adult male population had not signed the
treaty, and that the consent of those who had signed was procured by
fraud.8 6
The Supreme Court refused to uphold the Native Americans' claims
on the ground that the claims in effect ignored the established guardian-
ward relationship. The Court reasoned that to uphold their claims
would be to say that the earlier treaty could operate "to materially limit
and qualify the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care'
and protection of the Indians," and might deprive Congress of all power
to partition and dispose of the tribal lands in an emergency.8 7 Thus, the
Court in Lone Wolf established the principle that Congress had the
power to unilaterally abrogate or modify the terms of a treaty or trust
relationship with Native Americans, even when it had promised that it
would not to do so. 88
The Lone Wolf principle granted Congress "manifestly awesome,
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and
because it alone can enforce its laws on all tribes." Id. at 384-85.
83. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
84. Id. at 565.
85. Id. at 564.
86. Id. The Native Americans also charged that interpreters of the treaty had falsely repre-
sented the sale price of $2.50 per acre when the terms of the treaty in fact provided for sale of the
land for $1.00 per acre, an amount the Native Americans charged was far below the real value of the
land. The Native Americans also averred that Congress had changed portions of the agreement
without first submitting the changes to the Native Americans for their review and consideration. Id.
at 561.
87. Id. at 564.
88. Chambers, supra note 63, at 1225. (Chambers also characterizes the effect of Lone Wolf as
"resuscitating the conquered subjects approach" to dealing with the Native Americans.).
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perhaps unlimited"8 9 legislative power over Native Americans. That this
plenary power was construed as arising from a duty to care for and pro-
tect the Native Americans was remarkable. No less remarkable, given
the clear breach of the government's earlier treaty promises, was the
Lone Wolf Court's declaration that "[w]e must presume that Congress
acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the Indians... and that
[Congress] exercised its best judgment .... [T]he judiciary cannot ques-
tion or inquire into [Congress'] motives." 9 The Court in Lone Wolf also
commented that Congress always had exercised plenary power over Na-
tive Americans, 91 that the power always had been political in nature, 92
and that because these matters were solely political, Congress' action was
conclusive upon the courts.93
That the management of Native American property is exclusively a
political question is a lingering notion, one which continues to present an
obstacle to Native Americans seeking judicial review of current claims. 94
Moreover, the power of Congress recognized under the Kagama and
Lone Wolf interpretations of the guardian-ward relationship survives in-
tact today." Although courts generally recognize that the guardian-
ward doctrine imposes a trust responsibility upon Congress, "they uni-
formly regard it as essentially a moral obligation, without justiciable
standards for its enforcement. '96
C. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act
In 1978, six years after the Supreme Court decided Yoder, Congress
passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act 97 in recognition of
its past insensitivity to Native American religious freedom. 98 Congress
89. Id. at 1226.
90. 187 U.S. at 568. Article IV, section 3 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power to make all necessary rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belong-
ing to the United States.
91. Id. at 565.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 568.
94. See generally Chambers, supra note 63.
95. In addition to Kagama and Lone Wolf, cases containing language sustaining "plenary"
congressional power to alter or abrogate treaty rights include United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S.
535, 538-39 (1938) and Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902).
For a more in-depth discussion of Congress' plenary power over Native Americans, see Royster
and Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the
Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581 (1989).
96. Chambers, supra note 63, at 1227.
97. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)).
98. H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, [hereinafter REPORT] reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1262, 1263-64, (also reprinted in Stambor, Manifest Destiny and
American Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoya, Badoni and the Drowned Gods, 10 AM. INDIAN L.
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found that the absence of a clear federal policy protecting Native Ameri-
can religious practices, and ignorance about their religious needs, 99 had
contributed to interference with Native American religious practices.'0°
Specifically, Congress acknowledged that governmental regulations and
policies addressing land and natural resource conservation in particular
had deterred, and even prohibited at times, Native American religious
practices.' 0 Congress also recognized that Native American religious
practices formed the basis of Indian identity and value systems, and that
traditional Native American religions were an integral, indispensable and
irreplaceable part of Indian life.' 0 2 Thus, the Act expressly recognized
religion as a central element of Native American culture. This recogni-
tion held the promise of bringing Native American religious claims in
line with traditional religious claims for purposes of judicial review. As a
result, Native American religious claims that fall within the scope of the
Act would seem to be presumptively recognized as a constitutional bur-
den on religion, thereby triggering the traditional free exercise balancing
test of Yoder and Sherbert.0 3
With passage of the Act, the United States adopted a policy "to
protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of free-
dom to believe, express, and exercise [their traditional religions]."' 4 In
REV. 59, 88-89 (1982)). See also Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights to the Use of Public
Lands, 63 B.U.L. REV. 141, 152 (1983).
One example of governmental insensitivity toward Native American religion is that, under the
auspices of federal law, the Tennessee Valley Authority impounded a tract of land containing a large
number of cemeteries - some for whites, some for blacks and some for Native Americans. Archae-
ologists removed all of the bodies and reinterred all but the Native American bodies into state ceme-
teries. The Native American bodies were stored as "matters of scientific interest" in boxes and bags
at a state university, despite requests by Native American leaders that the bodies be reinterred, in
line with strong religious beliefs regarding respect for the dead. Note, The American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act - An Answer to the Indian's Prayers?, 29 S.D.L. REV. 131, 134 (1983).
99. REPORT, supra note 98. See Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Re-
sources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5 (1982). (It
is somewhat euphemistic to say that the reasons for infringements on Native American religious
practices are ignorance and insensitivity. A more accurate view is that the infringements are a prod-
uct of ongoing cultural conflicts between Native American and dominant American culture.)
100. REPORT, supra note 98. See Suagee, supra note 98, at 8-9. (It may be that the deterrence
and prohibitions of Native American religious practices stem from a continuing intolerance by the
Judeo-Christian mainstream, in its persisting view of tribal religions as primitive and superstitious,
and in its longstanding efforts to convert Indians to Christianity in order for the Native Americans
to achieve Christian afterlife.).
101. REPORT, supra note 98. See Suagee, supra note 98, at 8-9.
102. REPORT, supra note 98.
103. For a more in-depth argument that the American Indian Religious Freedom Act created a
presumption of weightiness of the claimed burden on Native American religion, see Note, The First
Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: An Approach to Protecting Native
American Religion, 71 IOWA L. REV. 869, 877-90 (1986).
104. REPORT, supra note 98. This included but was not limited to access to sites, use and posses-
sion of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
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addition, the Act required the federal government to involve Native
American religious leaders in evaluating any public land and conserva-
tion policies which could adversely affect Native American religious
practices.105 However, the Act did not create a cause of action for the
breach of this policy. At most, the Act was a hopeful sign that in cases
where the government sought to interfere with Native American sacred
sites, Native Americans would enjoy greater constitutional protection
under the first amendment free exercise clause than they had before.
One commentator predicted that the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act was unlikely to aid Indians at all, though perhaps it would
remind government officials and agencies to consider more seriously the
religious interests of Native Americans. 0 6 Another characterized the
Act as a "legislative 'white elephant' left over from the days of the
human rights-conscious Carter administration." 10 7 Yet another interpre-
tation is that the Act reinforced a moral duty owed by the government to
protect the Native Americans, a duty arising from a general trust, or
guardian-ward relationship with Native Americans. Such a reading
would require, theoretically at least, that courts resolve conflicts between
the federal government and Native American religious practices in favor
of the Native Americans. This use of the guardian-ward relationship as a
basis for protecting Native Americans would be directly at odds with the
general power interpretation that emerged in the Lone Wolf principle -
that Native Americans are dependent wards of the United States, subject
to Congress' plenary power as guardian.
Yet the Act provided no cause of action and no administrative rem-
edy. As a result, its effectiveness ultimately depended on a judicial inter-
pretation of the Act as an enforcement provision of the general moral
duty to protect the religious freedom of Native Americans. In short, the
effectiveness of the Act depended on judicial good will. Although there
have been attempts to rely on the Act in various Native American sacred
site cases, no court has granted it any weight beyond, or different from,
the first amendment. 10 8 The only exceptions were the federal district and
105. Id.
106. See Stambor, supra note 98, at 87.
107. Note, supra note 98, at 143.
108. Michaelsen, American Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3 J.L. &
RELIGION 47, 57 (1985). In Fools Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d
856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), the court reasoned that the Act required only that
agencies evaluate their policies with the aim of protecting Native American religious freedom and
noted that the Act was only a policy statement which created no cause of action. 541 F. Supp. at
791, 793. In Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981),
the court did not consider the Act because its constitutionality was not properly before it. 638 F.2d
at 180. In Sequoya v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
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appellate courts whose decisions the Supreme Court reversed in Lyng.
D. Native Americans and the Free Exercise Clause
1. The U.S. Courts of Appeals
In the ten years following the passage of the American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act, not one Native American free exercise claim pre-
vailed over an asserted governmental interest. Four federal circuit courts
denied protection under the free exercise clause to Native Americans
who sought to prevent the government from disturbing, destroying, or
preventing access to Native American sacred sites. 1°9
The federal courts of appeals have subjected Native American reli-
gious claims to standards far more rigorous than those the Supreme
Court set in Yoder and Sherbert. While a Yoder/Sherbert analysis would
require only that a religious practice be "important," the lower courts
have developed and applied a standard of proof that is almost impossible
to meet. In these cases, the courts have required that the Native Ameri-
cans prove that the religious practices, and the exercise of those practices
at the specific sites, were "central" and "indispensable" - that is, abso-
lutely required by their religion. 110
These tests reduce the scope of Native American religious claims
and have little precedent in other free exercise cases. 11 For example, the
Court in Yoder, requiring only that the threatened religious practice be
central to the Amish beliefs, used the centrality inquiry solely to ensure
the legitimacy of the claim. 112 In the Native American cases, courts have
carried the centrality inquiry to another level by focusing on the relation-
ship between the practice and the particular site in question, a relation-
ship not generally recognized in Christian-Judeo belief systems., 13 As a
result, the inquiries are often dispositive, because they serve to circum-
vent a proper balancing of the interests at stake. Where Native Ameri-
can claimants could not overcome these initial, nearly insurmountable
(1980), the court ruled that the enabling act for the Tellico Dam overrode any applicability the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act might have. 620 F.2d at 1161.
109. See supra note 4.
110. Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development: A New Breed of Religion Cases, 1984
UTAH L. REV. 313, 328-29. That Note further argues that it is questionable whether such a burden
of proof is practical in assuring religious freedom and asserts that "if no practice can be shown to be
important enough to be protected, then the religion clauses ensure nothing." Id. at 329-30.
111. Barsh, supra note 78, at 411. Barsh also contends that these tests are slippery slopes that do
not correspond to distinctions recognized by Native Americans themselves. Id.
112. Unmack, Equality Under the First Amendment: Protecting Native American Religious Prac-
tices on Public Lands, 8 PuB. LAND. L. REV. 165, 174 (1987).
113. See Note, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development. A Conven-
tional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 MICH. L. REV. 771, 783-91 (1987).
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hurdles of showing that the religious activity at the particular sites was
central or indispensable, the courts never reached the balancing compo-
nent of traditional free exercise analysis. By failing to weigh the Native
American religious interests against the asserted governmental interest,
the courts have denied Native Americans the constitutional protection
afforded other religious claimants.
The first of the Native American site-specific free exercise cases was
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority.1 4 In Sequoyah, the Sixth Circuit
denied protection to Cherokee Indians who claimed that the operation of
a dam would cause flooding which would destroy some sacred sites and
prevent access to others.1 5 If the court had applied a Sherbert/Yoder
test, the Native Americans probably would have prevailed because the
government could not show a compelling need to continue operating the
dam. However, the Sequoyah court refused to weigh the interests at all;
instead it reasoned that the Cherokee sacred sites were not sufficiently
central or indispensable to the Indian religion to merit free exercise pro-
tection. 116 The court interpreted the Supreme Court's dicta in Yoder as
requiring that the threatened religious practice be central to the religion
itself. Actually, the determining elements in Yoder were the nature and
extent of the burden on religion, and the Court considered indispensabil-
ity of the religious practices merely to help measure the extent of the
burden."t 7 The Sequoyah court rejected the Cherokees' claims on two
additional grounds: that the Cherokees had failed to show that their con-
victions were shared by an organized group;" t8 and that the threatened
practices were merely family and cultural folklore and traditions, not
religious exercise protected by the first amendment."t 9
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit avoided a proper SherbertlYoder bal-
ancing test in Badoni v. Higginson. t20 In Badoni, Navajo Indians claimed
that a government reservoir had damaged a natural sandstone bridge,
114. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
115. Id. at 1160, 1162. The court had already slowed construction of the dam because the flood-
ing would destroy the home of the snail darter, which was protected by the Endangered Species Act.
620 F.2d at 1161. Congress then authorized completion of the dam, notwithstanding any statutes to
the contrary. Sewell, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 429, 451
(1983).
116. Id. at 1164. For a more in-depth discussion of how application of the centrality test de-
feated the claims in Sequoyah, as well as the claims of other Native Americans in similar cases,
including Lyng, see Pryor & Bailey, An Indian Site-Specific Religious Claim Again Trips Over Judeo-
Christian Stumbling Blocks, 5 J. LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 293 (1989).
117. Conundrum, supra note 45, at 282 n.85.
118. 620 F.2d at 1164.
119. Id. at 1164-65. For a discussion of the difficulty in departmentalizing Native American life
into religious and non-religious categories, see Conundrum, supra note 45, at 283-85.
120. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
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which the Indians regarded as the sacred home of some of their gods.
They also claimed that tourists interfered with the Native Americans' use
of the bridge for important prayer ceremonies.' 2 1  Specifically, the
Navajos sought only to lower the water level and restrict the public's use
of the sacred bridge on rare occasions, to enable them to continue their
religious ceremonies there. 122 The Badoni court refused to weigh the
burden on Native American religious practice, explaining that it found
the government's interest in maintaining the reservoir and in promoting
public recreational use of the area to be "compelling."' 23 Ultimately, the
Badoni court denied free exercise protection on the dubious ground that
to grant the Navajo's requests would facilitate the Native American reli-
gious practices in violation of the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment.1 24 The court's use of the establishment clause to render the free
exercise clause useless was especially questionable, given the Navajo's
modest requests. Moreover, although the two clauses of the first amend-
ment inherently compete with one another, the free exercise clause is
generally considered to prevail. 125
Consistent with the Sequoyah and Badoni courts, the Eighth Circuit
in Fools Crow v. Gullet 126 and the D.C. Circuit Court in Wilson v.
Block 127 avoided applying the traditional free exercise balancing test to
121. Id. at 178.
122. Id. at 177-78.
123. Id. at 177 n.4.
124. 638 F.2d at 178-80.
125. Addressing the House of Representatives during the free exercise debates, James Madison
said that some states were concerned that, because Congress was empowered to make all laws neces-
sary and proper to carry into execution the Constitution and the laws under it, Congress could make
laws that might infringe the rights of conscience and establish a national religion. House of Represen-
tative, Amendments to the Constitution, 1:729-31, 755, 766 (August 15, 17, 20, 1789) reprinted in
FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 88 (emphasis added). Therefore, whenever a free exercise claim con-
flicts with the establishment clause, giving greater support to the free exercise clause would be more
faithful to the framers' intent. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 819.
Furthermore, when violation of the establishment clause has been raised as a defense to a free
exercise claim, the establishment clause can accommodate action necessary to ensure freedom of
religion. Note, supra note 110, at 331. That Note also argues that if no affirmative action is allowed
to protect religion against the effects of government regulation, then religion has no protection. Id.
at 332.
Sewell asserts that when the government itself created the injury to religion, moderation of the
injury would be the religiously neutral course, and that for government to claim the establishment
clause prevents such a moderation, it is "in the hypocritical position of using the high principle of
religious neutrality to support a hostile policy." Sewell, supra note 115, at 464.
See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is disingenu-
ous to look for a purely secular purpose [of government action] when the manifest objective... is to
facilitate the free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden."); Wilson, 708 F.2d at
747 ("[W]here governmental action violates the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause
ordinarily does not bar judicial relief.").
126. 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
127. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
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Native American religious claims. In Fools Crow, an action brought by
Lakota and Tsistsistas Indians, the court held that South Dakota's plans
to build roads, parking lots and viewing platforms throughout sacred ar-
eas did not violate the Native Americans' religious freedom because the
state was not directly prohibiting religious acts.1 28 The district court in
Fools Crow declared that the state had no constitutional duty to provide
the environment for carrying out religious practices, and warned that the
"government risks being haled into court by others who claim that the
... rights of the general public are being unduly burdened, or that state
government has become excessively entangled with religion. 29
Similarly, in Wilson, Navajo and Hopi Indians claimed that for the
government to permit development of a ski resort on sacred sites would
effectively prohibit the practice of their religions. 30 Nonetheless, the
court stated that the burden did not warrant application of the Sherbert
compelling interest test because "Sherbert... did not purport to create a
benchmark against which to test all indirect burden claims.' 3' Instead,
the Wilson court created its own test: Unless the Navajo and Hopi
claimants could prove that their religious practices could not be per-
formed at sites other than that of the proposed ski resort, no actual bur-
den on religion existed. t32 The court held in favor of the government and
permitted development of the ski resort on Native American sacred sites.
Sequoyah, Badoni, Fools Crow and Wilson illustrate the lower fed-
eral courts' refusal to afford Native Americans the degree of free exercise
protection mandated by the Supreme Court in Sherbert, Yoder and
Thomas. Each of the courts found an alternative path to reach the con-
clusion that the government had not violated Native American religious
freedoms. The primary obstacle for the Native Americans was the
courts' insistence that the claimants prove centrality and indispensability
before the court would engage in a balancing of interests. The virtual
insurmountability of these initial requirements circumvented the proper
balancing test and thus ensured that a complete free exercise analysis
would never be reached. In this way, the operation of a marginally use-
ful dam, the promotion of tourism and recreation, and the development
of a ski resort prevailed over the Native Americans' constitutional right
128. 706 F.2d at 856. See Sewell, supra note 115, at 456-57 ("The court scolded the state for
pursuing precisely the kinds of practices the American Indian Religious Freedom Act was designed
to promote, and which Congress had hoped to encourage on the part of the states, as well as the
federal government.").
129. 541 F. Supp. at 787-89.
130. 708 F.2d at 739.
131. Id. at 743.
132. Id. at 744.
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to the free exercise of their religion. This outcome calls to mind one
commentator's observation, in a discussion of economic versus Native
American religious uses of public land, that "[a]s American law stands
today organized churches can acquire title through adverse possession by
praying on a site for less than a lifetime, while Indians' prayers do not
make out title even after a millennium."'1
33
2. The Supreme Court
Subsequent to Sequoyah, Badoni, Fools Crow and Wilson, the
Supreme Court in Bowen v. Roy t34 denied protection in its first free exer-
cise case involving Native Americans, although that case did not involve
the governmental use of sacred sites. In Roy, Native American parents
of a two-year-old girl contested the government's use of a social security
number to identify their daughter, claiming that according to their
Abenaki religious beliefs, such unique identification would rob their
daughter of her spirit and her ability to protect herself from evil.' 35 The
Roy Court, like the federal appellate courts, refused to follow Sherbert
and Yoder, asserting that the compelling interest/least restrictive means
analysis was inappropriate 36 because the burden on the Native Ameri-
cans' religious freedom was merely indirect and incidental. 37 The Court
commented that virtually every government action could be susceptible
to a free exercise objection and hypothesized that "[s]omeone might raise
a religious objection, based on Norse mythology, to filing a tax return on
Wednesday (Woden's day)."' 138 The Court concluded that the framers
did not intend to require the government first to show a compelling inter-
est before it could enforce generally applicable rules.
Perhaps the most disturbing element of the Roy decision was the
Court's outright refusal to acknowledge the claimed impact on the Na-
tive American's religious beliefs - robbing a child of her spirit. The
Court stated expressly that the use of the social security number simply
133. Barsh, supra note 78, at 410. Although Barsh's observation was directed at legislative alter-
natives for dealing with religious versus economic uses of public land involving claims of title, the
comment is useful in considering the courts' reluctance to acknowledge Native Americans' religious
ties to specific sacred sites, particularly when governmental economic interests are at stake.
134. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
135. Id. at 696-97. As descendants of the Abenaki Tribe of Native Americans, the Roys asserted
a religious belief that control over one's life is essential to spiritual purity and indispensable to "be-
coming a holy person" and that the assignment of a social security number would take away that
control. Id. at 696.
136. Id. at 707.
137. Id. at 706. The Court explained that "A governmental burden on religious liberty is not
insulated from review simply because it is indirect, (citations omitted); but the nature of the burden
is relevant to the standard the government must meet to justify the burden." Id. at 706-07.
138. Id. at 707 n.17.
1989]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
did not itself in any degree impair religious belief, expression or exer-
cise.139 Instead of weighing the potential impact, as the Court had in
Yoder, the Roy Court focused on the nature of the government's conduct.
The Court emphasized that the government's social security number re-
quirement was an internal matter promoting the legitimate and impor-
tant interest of preventing fraud, 140 and was therefore not subject to free
exercise scrutiny.1 4 Emphasizing the internal nature of the government
conduct, the Court stated, "Roy may no more prevail on his religious
objection to the Government's use of a Social Security number for his
daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or
color of the Government's filing cabinets."'142
Ultimately, the Court interpreted the claim as one which, if recog-
nized, would require the government itself to conform to the religious
beliefs of the Native Americans, a requirement the free exercise clause
was not intended to impose. 43 Roy reinforced the dichotomy reflected in
free exercise claims involving Native Americans versus those involving
other, perhaps more conventional, religious groups. Consistent with the
federal appellate courts' treatment of Native American religious claims,
the Supreme Court seemed to refuse to take seriously the potential im-
pact that specific government actions could have on the Native Ameri-
cans' religious practices.
However, the Court's considerable emphasis on the internal nature
of the government's action in Roy left open the question of whether, in a
case involving Native American religious freedom and the government's
use of public land - clearly not an internal matter - the Court would
reach a different result. Moreover, given the misapplication of Supreme
Court precedent by the lower courts in Native American free exercise
cases, a Supreme Court decision specifically involving sacred sites carried
the potential for bringing Native American religions properly within the
protection of the first amendment free exercise clause. It was against this
backdrop that the Supreme Court in Lyng refused to acknowledge the
destruction of sacred sites as an unconstitutional burden on Native
American religion. 44
139. Id. at 700.
140. Id. at 709.
141. Id. at 700, 707, 711-12. The Court specifically stated that the free exercise test applied in
cases like Yoder was not appropriate in this setting. Id. at 707.
142. Id. at 700.
143. Id. at 699.
144. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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II. L YNG v NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY
PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION
A. Case History
The United States Forest Service planned to pave a six-mile road-
way through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest,
an area adjoining the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation and traditionally
used for religious purposes by Native Americans of the Yurok, Kurok
and Tolowa Indian tribes.' 45 A government-commissioned study found
that the entire area was significant, integral and indispensable to the Na-
tive Americans' religion and way of life. The report recommended
against building the road at all, because any of the available routes would
seriously and irreparably damage the sacred areas. 146
The government decided not to follow the recommendation, choos-
ing instead to construct the road, following a route that avoided specific
archeological and sacred sites. 147 The government then added a plan to
develop a timber harvesting operation which involved harvesting 733
million board feet of timber over an eighty-year period148 in the same
area.' 49 Under the plan, an estimated seventy-six logging trucks and
ninety-two other vehicles would drive through the area each day.150
1. The Trial Court
The Native Americans brought suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California,1 5' claiming that the government's
decisions violated the first amendment free exercise clause.' 5 2 The dis-
trict court conducted the traditional free exercise balancing test, and as a
result, issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the government from
145. Id. at 442.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 443.
148. 795 F.2d at 690.
149. The government planned to provide a one-half mile protective zone between the timber
harvesting operation and specific religious sites. 485 U.S. at 443.
150. 565 F. Supp. at 592 n.5.
151. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
152. The Native Americans claimed that the Forest Service violated: (1) the first amendment of
the United States Constitution; (2) the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996 (1982); (3) the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982 & Supp. III
1985); (4) the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); (5) the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); (6) the Multiple Use Sus-
tained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1982); (7) the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); (8) the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1982); and (9) the government's trust responsibility to protect the water and fishing rights reserved
to the Native Americans on the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. 565 F. Supp. at 590-91.
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constructing the road or developing the timber harvesting operation.' 5 3
The court found that none of the claimed government interests would be
materially served by the road and management plan: access to the tim-
ber resources would not be improved and the number of jobs in the area
would not increase; recreational use of the area was sufficient and would
not increase dramatically; and permitting motor vehicles would contrib-
ute to environmental degradation. 15 4 In addition, the court determined
that the government's interest in fire protection, road maintenance, and
administrative services did not justify an infringement on first amend-
ment rights.1 55 The court dismissed as speculative the Forest Service's
claim that its reserves of timber would be increased, and it dismissed as
insufficient the government's interest in completing the road based on
past investment in the already paved section of the road.1 56 Finally, the
court noted that the management plan was not the least restrictive means
of accomplishing the government's ends.' 57
While an appeal was pending before the Ninth Circuit, Congress
enacted the California Wilderness Act.' 58 The Act designated much of
the area at issue as wilderness area, thereby prohibiting a significant por-
tion of the proposed timber harvesting. The statute exempted the pro-
posed route for construction of the roadway, although other sections of
the roadway were part of the wilderness area and therefore closed to
general traffic.
2. The Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's injunction barring the
government from implementing its plans. 59 The court reasoned that
under Yoder, the proposed interference with the Native Americans' reli-
gion was impermissible under the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment on the grounds that: the projects would have a significant, though
largely indirect, adverse impact on Native American religious practices;
the government had not shown a compelling interest in completing the
projects; and the government could have abandoned its plans without
creating a "religious preserve" in violation of the establishment clause. t60
153. 565 F. Supp. at 597. Before deciding the case on the merits, the district court had denied a
preliminary injunction which the Native Americans had sought after exhausting administrative rem-
edies. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982).




158. Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984).
159. 795 F.2d at 698.
160. Id. at 688, 691, 693-95.
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Commentators praised the Ninth Circuit decision as an important vic-
tory for Native Americans, 16' one which evidenced a burgeoning aware-
ness of Native American site-specific religious rights 162 and indicated a
shift toward greater judicial recognition and acceptance of the nature of
Native American religious beliefs.' 63
B. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit relative to the free
exercise clause. 164 The Court primarily relied on its decision in Roy, rea-
soning that the government's action in Lyng could not meaningfully be
distinguished from the government's action in Roy. 65 In addition, the
Court emphasized that, because the government did not coerce the Na-
tive Americans into violating their religious beliefs, it did not abridge the
Native Americans' religious freedom.' 66 The Court distinguished Lyng
from Yoder on the basis that the Native Americans were not threatened
with criminal sanctions for their religious practices, as were the Amish in
Yoder. 16 7
The Court acknowledged that the proposed road and timber har-
vesting would have devastating effects on traditional Native American
religious practices but explained that the adverse impact on the religion
was not a proper measure of whether the government abridged the Na-
tive Americans' free exercise rights. 168 The Court did not reveal what, if
not the adverse impact on religion, would be a proper measure of the
government's interference. Instead, the Court proceeded to assert that
regardless of the impact on the Native Americans' religion, the Constitu-
tion simply provided no principle for upholding the Native Americans'
free exercise claim.' 69
In addition, the Court expressed concern that, if it were to affirm the
injunction, the Native Americans or other religious objectors might bring
161. Note, American Indians and the First Amendment: Site-Specific Religion and Public Land
Management, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 673, 686.
162. Unmack, supra note 112, at 176.
163. Note, supra note 161, at 691, 694.
164. 485 U.S. at 458. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Scalia joined. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice Kennedy took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 441.
165. Id. at 448-49.
166. Id. at 450.
167. Id. at 455-57.
168. Id. at 451.
169. Id. at 451-52.
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future claims seeking even more exclusive use of the land, which could
lessen the government's property rights and establish a governmental
subsidy of the Indian religion. 170 The Court added, "Whatever rights the
Indians may have to the use of the area.., do not divest the Government
of its right to use what is, after all, its land."' 17'
The Court concluded that in Lyng, the government had acted in
accordance with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. The
Court first pointed out that the government had commissioned a compre-
hensive study of the impact its plans would have on the Native Ameri-
cans and that the government had tried to minimize that impact. The
Court then suggested that, as a result of the government's compliance
with the requirements of the Act, it was difficult to see how the govern-
ment could have been more respecting of the Native Americans' religious
needs. 172
2. The Dissent
Dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun disagreed
with virtually every assertion of the majority. The dissenting opinion in
Lyng rejected the majority's assertion that federal land use decisions are
beyond the reach of the free exercise clause, emphasizing that such an
exception cannot be found in the Constitution or judicial precedent. 173
The dissent also rejected the majority's distinction between governmental
coercion or penalty and lesser governmental actions, noting that any
form of governmental action that interferes with religious practice is pro-
hibited by the Constitution. 174
The dissent distinguished Lyng from Roy, pointing out the substan-
tial external effects of federal land use decisions versus the internal nature
of government recordkeeping at issue in Roy, 1 7 and analogized Lyng
with Yoder, focusing on the potential destruction of a religious way of life
in each case. 176 Finally, the dissent concluded that the majority's failure
to recognize the religious and cultural differences between Native Ameri-
cans and the dominant western culture177 made a mockery of the Ameri-
170. Id. at 452-53.
171. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
172. Id. at 454.
173. Id. at 473-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 459, 471-72.
175. Id. at 470-71.
176. Id. at 474-75.
177. Id. at 474. See also the dissent's lengthy treatment of Native American religious beliefs and
practices. Id. at 459-62.
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can Indian Religious Freedom Act. 178
III. LONE WOLF REVISITED: THE SUPREME COURT AND LYNG
In a memo to the President of the United States in 1892, the Ameri-
can Bar Association Committee on Law and the Courts for Indians
urged the President to step up the government's policy of absorbing Na-
tive Americans into the general population as soon as possible, urging
that to delay would require one or two generations to settle the "Indian
question."'' 79 The Supreme Court in Lyng moved closer to "settling the
question" by essentially excluding Native Americans from the constitu-
tional guarantee of the free exercise of their distinctive religion, thereby
denying the Native Americans the freedom to maintain their cultural and
religious differences. Its refusal to apply a just constitutional analysis to
the competing interests of Native American religious freedom and gov-
ernment land use reinforced a disturbing dichotomy: the free exercise of
religion is constitutionally protected; Native American religious exercise
is not.'t 0
In Lyng, the rejection of Yoder as the appropriate precedent forced
the Court to discard numerous free exercise principles in order to defend
its position. First, the Court asserted that because the government action
in Lyng did not directly coerce the Native Americans into violating their
religious beliefs, its indirect interference was constitutionally permissible.
Yet, this coercion test was discarded long ago in Braunfeld, and when it
came up in Thomas, was completely abandoned. Furthermore, since
Cantwell, the Court consistently had interpreted the free exercise clause
to protect religious action as well as belief. For more than twenty-five
years before Lyng, the courts readily accepted that indirect burdens on
religious belief and practices were constitutionally protected.
Next, the Lyng Court hypothesized that if it were to accommodate
the Native Americans' religious practices by preventing the road con-
struction and timber project, the Native Americans might bring another
178. Id. at 477.
179. M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 92 (1973) (emphasis in original).
180. A similar explanation is that this dichotomy may have its roots in the "reserved rights"
approach to governmental relations with Native Americans regarding land ownership and use. In
the beginning, of course, the Native Americans had exclusive control over the land. Then, as treaties
were formed between the United States and Native Americans, the treaties dealt with specific rights
only, and the Native Americans retained all other rights. To protect the reserved rights, the courts
over the years developed a set of rules of judicial interpretation to apply specifically to Native Ameri-
can issues, while a different set of rules applied to law in general. This created a frustrating dichot-
omy, since one approach favored the Native Americans and the other destroyed any chance for the




lawsuit to exclude all people except Native Americans from using the
land in any way. '8' This possibility was not even remotely suggested by
the facts in Lyng, nor was there any reasonable likelihood that such a
claim would succeed if the Court were to uphold the Native Americans'
claims in Lyng. Furthermore, because the appropriate, Yoder/Sherbert
balancing test depends on a factual, case-by-case inquiry, the Court's ap-
plication of the test in Lyng would not have resulted in an undue increase
in the number of sacred site cases occupying the courts. 8 2 More impor-
tant, as one commentator correctly noted, the "courts do have a role
when public land management abridges religious freedom, and the possi-
bility of a floodgate of litigation is inadequate justification for a miserly
interpretation of constitutional rights."'' 83
The Lyng Court's departure from Sherbert was even more pro-
nounced in its refusal to weigh the government's interest in building the
six-mile segment of road and in harvesting timber in the few areas not
designated as federally protected wilderness areas by the California Wil-
derness Act against the serious and irreparable damage to the Native
Americans' religion. Nowhere in the Lyng majority opinion did the
Court even begin to address the specific nature of the governmental inter-
est in these land use developments, other than to suggest that the govern-
ment has an ultimately superior right to use "what is, after all, its
land." 8 4 And this argument - actually a conclusion - that the govern-
ment's ownership of the land provided an inherent entitlement to re-
strain, even indirectly, the religious requirements of Native Americans,
reflected an unprincipled interpretation of the free exercise clause. The
"property interest" basis for denying free exercise claims raises the ques-
tion, of course, of where the government "got" the property in the first
place. 185 Moreover, the Court's bold statement that it could not uphold
the Native Americans' claim because "[t]he Constitution simply does not
provide a principle that could justify [doing so],'186 might more accu-
rately be applied to the Court's own assertion that the government as
landowner automatically prevailed.
Perhaps most unsettling was the Lyng Court's rejection of Yoder.
181. 485 U.S. at 452-53.
182. Note, supra note 113, at 805.
183. Comment, Constitutional Law - Religious Freedom and Public Land Use, Wilson v. Block,
708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 109, 118 (1985). Richard Schneebeck,
author of the Comment, also presents an excellent analysis of the compounding misinterpretations
and misapplication of the free exercise clause in Native American cases in the federal circuit courts.
184. 485 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
185. Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE
L.J. 1447, 1445 n.32 (1988).
186. 485 U.S. at 452.
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Not only would Yoder have required the balancing test introduced in
Sherbert, but it also would have mandated an analysis of how, if at all,
the government would have been harmed by abandoning its plans or
adopting less restrictive alternatives.18 7 The Lyng Court avoided these
two considerations, perhaps because under a Yoder analysis, the Native
Americans in Lyng would have prevailed.
That even under the most narrow reading of Yoder the Native
Americans probably would have prevailed suggests that the Court may
have found itself caught by its own narrowing dicta. The Court's predic-
tion in Yoder that "perhaps no other group could meet the demanding
standards required to overbalance the state's interest" 18 8 foreshadowed
the potential for uneven application of free exercise rights. But in Lyng,
the Native Americans did meet the Court's standards. The Yoder Court
stressed that the extent of the burden on the Amish religion was so per-
vasive as to command first amendment protection; the Court in Lyng
should have done the same. After all, the extent of the burden in Lyng
did pervade the Native American's way of life. Their Native American
religious beliefs and practices were intertwined with their distinct way of
life, just as the Amish religious practices pervaded the Amish way of life.
Similarly, the Yoder Court emphasized that first amendment protec-
tion was required under the Constitution because the potential impact on
Amish religious freedom was severe. In Lyng, the Court should have
done the same. The impact in Lyng was the probable devastation of the
Native Americans' entire religion, certainly no less than the potential im-
pact in Yoder. The Lyng Court's departure from Yoder in refusing to
weigh, or even to acknowledge, the impact on Native American religion
was insensitive and constitutionally unjustified. Nonetheless, the result
was not surprising, given the persistent power interpretation of the
guardian-ward relationship, a flawed concept that implicitly supports the
unjust treatment of Native Americans in the federal courts.
Ignoring the workable comparisons with Yoder was difficult, how-
ever, for the Lyng Court to accomplish gracefully. In an attempt to
avoid the obvious, the Court awkwardly reached to its decision in Roy
and insisted that it saw no meaningful difference between the govern-
ment's plans to develop a road and harvest timber on land essential to the
religious practice and identity of 5,000 Native Americans and the use of
a social security number for one child.18 9 Such a logical stretch was
187. See supra text accompanying notes 42-56.
188. 406 U.S. at 236.
189. 485 U.S. at 449.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
strikingly similar - perhaps distinguishable only in degree - to the
lower courts' avoidance of constitutionally sound principles in Native
American free exercise cases.190
It was up to the Court in Lyng to end this dichotomous application
of free exercise protection and afford Native Americans the religious
freedom promised by the Constitution and supported by the policy of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Yet, following its conclusion
that the Native Americans were not protected by the free exercise clause,
the Court in Lyng went on to suggest that the government had complied
with the policy of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act by com-
pleting a study of the sacred sites.191 Although the government rejected
the conclusion reached in the study and refused to follow its recommen-
dation, the Court nonetheless characterized the government's compli-
ance with the Act as "solicitous" and suggested that the government
could not have been more sympathetic to Native American religious
needs.' 92 Therefore, not only did Lyng reinforce a cruel judicial dichot-
omy, but also, it sanctioned the government's cursory and painfully
hollow commitment to the policy of the Native American Religious
Freedom Act.
Indeed, by allowing the probable destruction of the Native Ameri-
can religion, the Lyng Court was consistent with the government's initial
views toward "settling the Indian question."' 193 The judicial attitude in
Lyng was strikingly similar to the historical notion that Native Ameri-
cans should be assimilated into mainstream Christian culture. Like the
early Supreme Court cases which relied on conquest and the system of
property ownership to justify dominion over Native Americans, 194 the
Lyng decision centered on the government's power to manage its land to
justify allowing the destruction of a Native American religion. The re-
sult in Lyng was compatible with this early national policy, which was
rooted in the culturally imperialist, or power interpretation of the guard-
ian-ward doctrine.
190. This result implicates one author's poignant observation:
For centuries before [the Bill of Rights] philosophers, religious leaders, and statesmen
had asserted that men should be free of governmental coercion in their beliefs and in the
expression of their beliefs in matters of religion.
It is significant, however, that in most cases these protestors did not share the religious
views of the particular sect dominant at the time they spoke. When the tables were turned
and their own religious doctrines prevailed, they often forgot what they had said earlier.
L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 3.
191. 485 U.S. at 454-55.
192. Id. at 454.
193. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., supra notes 63-96 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the Lyng Court's refusal to acknowledge the obvious
burden on Native American religion demonstrated an unwillingness to
respect the distinct characteristics of the religious beliefs and practices of
the Native Americans. Although much has been written about the
Court's inability to understand unconventional religions, this lack of ac-
ceptance and respect surely did not arise from the Court's inability to
understand the nature of the Native American religion. Understanding
the religion for purposes of judicial review required only that the Court
accept that in Native American religious belief the physical and spiritual
are inseparable. If an analogy to Judeo-Christian belief were necessary,
the Court could imagine that under Native American religious belief, to
destroy the physical would be tantamount to destroying the effectiveness
of Christian or Jewish prayers. The inseparability of spiritual and physi-
cal aspects of religion is, of course, fundamentally different from tradi-
tional Judeo-Christian beliefs. But it is only different, not difficult.
In addition, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act suggested
a policy of respect for religious diversity. But the Lyng Court virtually
ignored the promise of an enlightened policy toward Native American
religion, a policy that stood in contrast with early federal policy directed
at "civilizing" Native Americans through conversion to Christianity.
Rather than fulfill the promise of the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act, the Court displayed a regressive attitude toward Native Ameri-
cans in concluding that their religious claims were not recognizable
under the Constitution. Specifically, since the impact of the decision in
Lyng will likely be the destruction of the Native Americans' religion, the
Court seems to have revived the culturally imperialistic attitude of assim-
ilating Native Americans into the religious mainstream.
Finally, the language in Lyng is reminiscent of early Supreme Court
cases in which the Court treated Native American issues as political
questions, which in effect denied the Native Americans judicial relief
when the government unfairly wielded its power. Similar to the Court's
refusal to protect the Cherokee Nation from losing its land to the state of
Georgia, the Lyng Court refused to prevent the destruction of the Native
American religion. The Court in Cherokee Nation stated, "If it be true
that the Cherokee Nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which
those rights are to be asserted .... [T]his is not the tribunal which can
redress the past or prevent the future." 1 95 The Court in Lyng observed,
"Whatever rights the Indians may have ... do not divest the Govern-
195. 30 U.S. at 20.
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ment of its right to use what is, after all, its land,"1 96 and concluded that
"[t]he Constitution simply does not provide a principle" that could jus-
tify upholding the Native American's religious claims. 197
CONCLUSION
The principle developed throughout the early Native American
cases and solidified in Lone Wolf is that under the guardian-ward theory
Congress has such unlimited power that it may unilaterally abrogate its
trust duty toward Native Americans. This power imbalance forms a fun-
damentally flawed basis for the relationship between Native Americans
and the United States government. 198 As one commentator noted, "It is
hardly surprising that this doctrine, which imposes only 'moral' duties
on the government as guardian, has remained advantageous to the guard-
ians rather than to their wards." 199 In sum, the historical treatment of
the guardian-ward relationship between the United States government
and Native Americans requires no accountability on the part of the
guardian. It mandates power to the government and leaves protection of
Native Americans open to choice.
The choice to protect is rarely made, however, because the depen-
dent status of Native Americans is inextricably linked to past concepts of
the Native American as "an uncivilized savage who was to be gradually
elevated to the level of a civilized human being."' 2°° The prevailing val-
ues are those expressed in the power interpretation of the guardian-ward
relationship, with its view toward assimilating Native Americans into
mainstream religious and social culture. The dependent status of Native
Americans, when first constructed, was designed to be temporary - un-
til cultural assimilation was complete. 20' The federal government's re-
sponsibility for civilizing Native Americans rested on the belief that "the
196. 485 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
197. Id. at 452.
198. See Sewell, supra note 115, at 439.
199. Note, supra note 185, at 1453.
200. Lobsenz, "Dependent Indian Communities": A Search for a Twentieth Century Definition,
24 ARz. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982).
201. Id. The guardian-ward relationship continued even after Native Americans were consid-
ered full citizens. Prior to the Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2) (1982), the majority of
Native Americans were not United States citizens. Treaty provisions and statutes, however, had
conferred citizenship in a piecemeal fashion upon some Native Americans, and the question arose
repeatedly as to whether citizenship was compatible with wardship status. The two would seem to
be incompatible, but the Supreme Court has held that even after citizenship has been conferred, the
status of guardian and ward may continue. United States v. Waller, 243 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1917).
See also Sewell, supra note 115, at 467-68. (The dual legal status expressed in the guardianship
doctrine is a kind of compromise theory, though not a practical or intellectually sound solution, and
has continued to plague Native Americans in the courts. Government, under the guardian-ward
theory, can choose to protect Native American religions, but usually has not.)
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Indian would inevitably abandon his inferior culture and become incor-
porated into the'fabric of American society. ' 20 2 Thus, the extent to
which the "cultural imperialism" 20 3 upon which the doctrine was
founded continues today may determine contemporary interpretations of
the relationship between government and Native Americans. 2°4 Indeed,
a power interpretation of the guardian-ward relationship seems to under-
lie the Supreme Court's decision in Lyng.
The Court's decision in Lyng essentially dismantled the free exercise
doctrine traceable from Reynolds through Thomas, leaving no coherent
guidelines for future courts to follow. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
courts will abandon the clear and workable analyses established in Sher-
bert and Yoder and attempt to rebuild from the Court's reasoning in
Lyng. Instead, courts probably will view Lyng as a distinctly "Native
American free exercise" case; that is, an exception to traditional first
amendment jurisprudence.
The result in Lyng is a needless tragedy for Native Americans. But
the future of the first amendment free exercise clause for more conven-
tional religions is not imperiled. On the contrary, the Court's ability to
distinguish Native American religious claims from other free exercise
cases will cut the other way as well, and save most religious claimants
from the narrow and constitutionally indefensible interpretation of reli-
gious freedom in Lyng.
In future Native American cases, courts also should reject the rea-
soning in Lyng and apply traditional free exercise doctrine to the reli-
gious claims. The differences in religious philosophy between Native
American and more conventional religions do not create insurmountable
analytical hurdles. These differences initially require the acceptance and
respect afforded other legitimate religious claims. From that point, the
traditional constitutional balancing test, carefully developed over the last
century, can and should be applied. Only in this way will Native Ameri-
cans properly be afforded the constitutional guarantee of the free exercise
of religion.
202. Lobsenz, supra note 199, at 8. For example, by the time the Court decided Cherokee Na-
tion, the government's efforts to assimilate the Native Americans into its own culture had begun.
The Court described the process approvingly, noting that a portion of the Native Americans had
become "civilized Christians and agriculturists ... and in these respects were willing to submit to a
comparison with their white brethren around them." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 6 (1831).
203. Lobsenz, supra note 199, at 2 ("There is simply no ignoring the fact that historically the
legal status of the American Indian is rooted in cultural imperialism.").
204. Lobsenz contends that "[e]very modern judicial opinion in the realm of Indian law pays lip
service to the rule that Indian tribes have the status of "dependent" or "semi-sovereign" nations, yet
no modern judge has taken the intellectually honest approach of conceding the culturally imperialis-
tic origins of that status." Id. at 8.
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